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ABSTRACT
This study analyzes the politicization of ethnic sentiments in Thailand 
with particular focus on Deep South of Thailand. It is divided into six 
parts. The first part examines the relationship between the Thailand’s 
political system and the minority groups within it. The second part 
explains the impact of ethnic politics in the Thailand’s political system. 
The third part discusses the function of ethnic politics. The fourth part 
examines the organizational base of ethnic politics in the region. The 
fifth part discusses the patterns of ethnic politics that have developed 
over the years. And the sixth part synthesizes the theories and practices 
of ethnic politics in the region. The data for this analysis came from 
primary and secondary sources, namely newspapers, internet, books, 
magazines, and journals. Interviews were also conducted. The study 
found that the politicization of ethnic sentiment was by product of 
structural inequalities in the socio-political and economic domains 
of the Thailand’s society which play important role in intensifying 
conflicts. As a result, the Malay Muslims ethnic group established 
their own ethnic associations or organizations which are responsible 
for the development of strong group identification leading to the 
emergence of secessionist groups in  deep south of Thailand that 
threaten the core values of the Royal Kingdom of Thailand.
Keywords: ethnic politics, structural inequalities, secessionist groups
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INTRODUCTION
Prior to the Western Powers’ arrival (British and Dutch) to what is 
presently known as Southern Thailand, the territory was part of the 
Malay World or “Nusantara” in Southeast Asia which comprised the 
modern Republic of the Philippines, Republic of Indonesia, Federal 
States of Malaysia, the Kingdom of Brunei Darussalam and the City-
State of Singapore. The Malay world included the some territories 
of the modern Royal Kingdom of Thailand, more specifically, the 
then “Great Kingdom of Pattani”, now known as Southern Thailand. 
The region was subjected to a pattern of gradual Islamization. 
In this regard, he said that the Pattani’s excellence as a center for 
Muslim scholarship dates back from this period, a distinction which 
characterizes it to this day (Fraser, 1960). The Malay Muslims struggle 
for self-determination and freedom has had a long history dating back 
to several attempts by Thailand to bring control over the region. These 
resulted to the occurrence of sporadic hostilities in 1636 between the 
Thai government and Pattani during the reign of the Thai Kingdom of 
Ayutthaya. As a result, the “Great Kingdom of Pattani” was defeated 
and eventually demised as a regional power (Chumphon, Interview, 
24 March 2013; Fraser, 1960). 
Generally, since then though there have been occurrence of 
rebellions by the Malay Muslims against the Thai government, but 
the Thai government managed to quell it and bring peace and stability 
in the region. However, with the recent outbreak of violent conflict 
on October 25, 2004 that killed at least 87 unarmed protestors have 
been killed or injured popularly known as the “Tak Bai Massacre” 
have ensured a sporadic, but sustained deadly attacks by rebels to 
avenge their community from the so-called government’s brutalities 
against the former’s community. Similarly, the government under 
former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin stressed the primacy of the use 
of force to deal with the liberation movements in Southern Thailand. 
In this juncture, John Roberts says “Thaksin has not only refused to 
apologize for the killings, but made clear that the Thai military will 
be intensifying its campaign of repression and intimidation in the 
predominantly Muslim region (John Roberts, 2004: 1). The victory of 
Pheu Thai political party, led by Prime Minister Yingluk Shinawatra, 
on the 3 July 2011 general election has renewed concerns to some 
quarters of the Malay Muslim population in Deep South of the country 
that brutal use of force to deal with conflict may once again intensify. 
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This was in contrast, in the 1980s and 1990s where there 
was relative peace and stability in the region under General Prem 
Tinsulanond (1980-1988) (Ahmad Amir Bin Abdullah, 2008: 102-
111). As a result, many analysts and leaders of both the Malay 
Muslims and the Buddhist-Siamese people erroneously thought they 
were about to close the chapter of ethnic/religious politics in Southern 
Thailand from politics to history, as something of the past, when they 
all thought that the melting pot or integration had made remarkable 
progress towards its goal, where the Malay Muslims were assured of 
their cultural and religious freedoms and rebels were given general 
amnesty that would lead to the co-existence of ethnically divided 
society.
However, as the failure of the policy of national integration 
or Thesaphiban and Thainess or Khwamphethai displays a surprising 
persistence of discord and tension in the Kingdom of Thailand, in 
general and, in Southern Thailand in particular.  In this respect, 
McCargo quoted Pasuk and Baker as saying “Since assimilation into 
Siam at the turn of the century, the Malay Muslims … had resisted 
assimilation into the Thai, Buddhist nation (McCargo, 2004: 3).
Similarly, Philips characterizes it as one of the great unfinished 
tasks of nation-building the Bangkok government must pay attention 
to with urgency: 
In the most general terms, the people of Bang Chan are 
like almost all ethnic Thai peasants (excepting on some 
counts Thai Moslems and some of the economically 
disenfranchised people of the Northeast) in that they have 
a keen sense of membership in the nation-state with a 
deep loyalty to the Crown, speak the Thai language, are 
Theravada Buddhists, are outwardly highly deferential 
to the authority of the Central government, and have a 
conception of the good life that stresses fun, physical 
comfort and security (Herbert  Philips, 1965: 16).
The distinctions that men make may be drawn along regional, 
economic, occupational, and ideological lines; they may involve 
clearly defined material and psychological interests which we readily 
identify as “political” (Shamsuddin L. Taya, 2010: 41-61). Among the 
common distinctions that have brought men together are those which 
we designate as “ethnic” that is, those distinctions based on race, 
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tribe, religion, language and other broadly defined cultural attributes. 
If we look outside Thailand, the bonds of blood and faith in most 
of the world strongly define political interest and conflict, thereby 
aggravating the fissures, and fortifying the fusions, that obtain in the 
polity. Such bond has natural and universal character as discussed in 
Ibn Khaldun’s “theory of assabiyah.” On the other hand, sometimes, 
they cut across such divisions and provide unity where none seemed 
possible. This is natural since affiliation, not only would ensure one’s 
protection and safety, but also provide an avenue of respect and 
recognition from other existing ethnic groupings. 
Ethnic politics should not be viewed as a parochial phenomenon, 
for there are few places on earth, developed or underdeveloped, 
where ethnicity is not presently of political significance. Even if we 
confine our attention to these distinctions that exist principally within 
national boundaries and say nothing of the usual animosity between 
nations, we are left with an imposing list. For instance, Bangsamoro 
versus Christian Filipino; Singhalese versus Tamil, Achenese versus 
Javanese, Tibetan versus Chinese, Turk versus Greek Cypriot, Arab 
versus  Jew; Christian versus Jew; Muslim versus Christian; Protestant 
versus Catholic; and so on. This list merely scratches the surface. This 
is more particularly true of Southeast Asian region, in general, and 
Thailand, in particular.
The Kingdom of Thailand is a cultural, linguistic and religious 
conglomeration, a fact that has led its polity to experience some 
share of ethnic politics. This paper is an investigation of that kind of 
politics in Thailand, in general, and Southern Thailand, in particular. 
It purports to be neither an exhaustive compendium of every study 
on the topic nor a historical account of every ethnic group that has 
ever expressed a political need or desire in this country. We are not 
motivated in this study by any intent to demonstrate the desirability 
or undesirability of ethnic politics. The primary questions guiding 
us are: what have been the impacts, styles, and conditions of ethnic 
political behavior? In other words, how can we best describe and 
account for ethnic politics and locate the causes and consequences of 
such politics? The key factors in the analysis of such questions appear 
to be the following:
1. The Thai socio-cultural system and how does it orchestrate and 
provide a means for the inculcation and achievement of ethnic 
values, beliefs, and symbols. 
  5JGD  Vol. 10, Issue 1, June 2014, 1-21 
2. What are the components of ethnic politics and what basic 
patterns dominate?
3. What are the pervasive consequences of ethnic politics for the 
functioning of the Thai political system?
4. How do the values, predispositions, and social positions of 
ethnic members and groups influence the varieties of ethnic 
politics in the region?
THE FACTOR OF ETHNICITY
Before attempting to assess the impact of ethnic politics in Southern 
Thailand, we must direct our attention to the relationship between the 
Thai political system and the minority groups that are part of it. First, 
it must be noted that the number of minority groups viable in the Thai 
society is extensive. However, for the purpose of this paper only a few 
will be discussed as they have, over the years, had the most obvious 
effect on the Thai political system.
Next, we must ask such questions as: Is the Thai socio-cultural 
system a unique blend of the multifarious groups that compose it, as 
the melting pot thesis argues? Or is this society really less a blend than 
a patchwork of ethnicity, held together by the necessary minimum 
of common loyalties but retaining more or less distinct sub-cultural 
groupings, as the cultural pluralism thesis would have it? Or should 
one speak of a dominant Siamese-Buddhist core socio-cultural 
system, in which ethnic groups enjoy more or less marginal status? 
Analysts of the Thai society have adhered firmly to one or the other 
of these ostensibly mutually exclusive models. Here we will briefly 
examine all three. 
The Melting Pot
In the early 1930s when the government’s institutionalized, 
patronized and developed a top-down policy of nation-building which 
emphasized Thainess known as Khwamphenthai (Ahmad Amir Bin 
Abdullah, 2008: 105) and before the cultural question had reached 
its crisis point, some educated and secular urbanites conceived of the 
congested cultures of Thailand as a bubbling melting pot that would 
eventually simmer into an invigorated and uniquely Thai product. For 
some groups the pot would understandably bubble more slowly. The 
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Malay Muslims, for instance, would retain distinctions in language, 
custom, and religion, but only for some time. Whatever the varying 
rates of assimilation, however, most marginal groups eventually will 
disappear and merge into the larger Thai cultural totality. These were 
the basic assumptions held by these groups of optimists which time 
has ever since invalidated.
Cultural Pluralism
History and the passing of time and the intensive and extensive 
rural-urban mobility have diminished ethnic uniqueness, but what is 
striking, some argue, is not the scope and rapidity of assimilation, but 
rather the persistence of unassimilated ethnic identities of the Thai 
society. To this school of thought the melting pot has never eradicated 
ethnic politics in the country. To these elements, Thailand still retains 
rather clear, long-standing ethnic distinctions which are operative in 
the country’s social and political life, and which show, every evidence 
of persisting.
Rather than a melting pot, Thailand is a patchwork of ethnic 
enclaves. The dominance of the Buddhist-Siamese culture should 
not force us to overlook the great variety of sub-cultures and sub-
communities, and minority group ties that still exist. Some argue such 
proponents of cultural pluralism as Muslim traditional politicians, 
who consider Thailand to be a democracy of nationalities, cooperating 
voluntarily and autonomously but within a united Thailand, in the 
enterprise of self-realization through the perfection of men according 
to their own kind. Such has been the official stance of Malay Muslim 
politicians and other religious groups who have allied themselves with 
the Thai government with respect to the issue of Southern Thailand 
problem. 
During the regime of General Prem Tinsulanond (1980-1988), 
there was concerted effort to accommodate and pacify the Malay 
Muslims through assuring the Malay Muslims of their cultural and 
religious freedoms- plus economic development for the south through 
National Security for the Southern Border Provinces Administrative 
Center (SBPAC). In this regard, he argued that such government’s 
accommodative policies for the Thai Muslims were mainly designed 
to accommodate the legitimate grievances of the latter by the former 
(Chumphon, Interview, 24 March 2013). For instance, the Thai 
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government appointed imams as the official heads of registered 
mosques, into a form of government proxy, answerable to the spiritual 
leader’ of Thai Muslims, who is also a royal adviser on Islamic 
affairs, through a national-level Islamic council. Since 1999, local 
imam have elected members of 29 provincial Islamic councils, who 
in turn nominate members of the national Islamic council and send 
delegates to select the Chularajamontri (Imtiyaz Yusuf, 1998:277–
98). However, imams of the mosques at the villages and municipal 
levels were appointed or selected by their respective community, he 
said (Mohammad Salleh, Interview, 26 March 2013).  
It seems the Thai government wanted to nationalize Islam 
in Thailand so as to curb its dissident tendencies and linking it to 
the legitimacy of the state. McCargo quoted Keyes and Swearer as 
portraying that the Islamic council system is part of ‘civic religion’ 
or ‘civil religion’ in Thailand (McCargo, Duncan, 2010: 93–113). 
However, with the failure of the Bangkok government to implement this 
policy effectively plus addressing cultural and religious sensitivities 
of the Malay Muslims clouded the prospect of attaining genuine 
integration (accommodation?) in the region and thus vindicated the 
separatist approach. Perhaps, one of the causes of the failure of the 
government’s policies towards the region is the non-inclusion of the 
political dimension of the conflict in the Deep South. The Thai policy-
makers have deliberately shied away any attempt that would include 
political solution to end the Deep South conflict despite of the fact 
that it is a political problem and therefore, needs political solution. 
In this connection, Haroon argued that the Thai government is in the 
state of denial because they cannot accept the fact that the problem in 
the region is a political one given by the fact that the Malay Muslims 
have been demanding for self-determination over their affairs more 
specifically on the recognition of their identity as Malay Muslims 
by the Thai government (Haroon Abdel Kadir, Interview, 25 March 
2013). 
The Core Culture
In attempting to address the extent of assimilation in Thailand, one 
should not overlook the question: assimilation into what? Indeed, 
assimilation had started already during the kingship of King 
Chulalongkorn when he annexed other territories including territories 
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of the Sultanate of Pattani. He established authority over them through 
administrative reforms and has continued up to the present. However, 
it was intensified during the ultra-nationalist’s regime that embarked 
on a policy of forced assimilation of different minority groups into the 
mainstream Thainess or Khwamphenthai (Brown, 1994;  Rahimullah, 
2003; Charles F. Keyes, 1971: 551-567). The Thai government aimed 
to absorb the cultures, religions, and languages of other minorities 
more specifically, the Malay Muslims, into the dominant Siamese-
Buddhist culture. The Thai government has used government 
establishments such as schools, universities, the media and so forth 
to carry this forward. 
However, the assimilation process was even more thorough and 
quick for those who chose to move to Bangkok in search of education 
and jobs. One may speak of a new blend pouring from the Thai 
crucible or a pluralistic patchwork of ethnic cultures, but adherents 
of this school of thought have explicitly or implicitly assumed 
that there is a “core culture” in Thailand, composed of essentially 
Siamese-Buddhist values, life styles, and identifications, to which a 
great number of ethnic cultures- except perhaps for the South- are in 
some way related. Such is the stance of most Monk leaders who take 
pride in Thailand as one of the Buddhist countries in Southeast Asian 
region.
Using language as an index of cultural diffusion (as the medium 
by which cultural forms are transmitted and social relations conducted), 
one can see that Thai language is prevalent all over the Kingdom of 
Thailand. A measure of ethnic influence is found in the wealth of 
foreign words that have been osmosed into a language that remains 
Thai. While the pluralists may point to multilingual communities in 
Thailand, from the far north to the extreme south, these exceptions 
prove the rule: in Thailand both officially and in practice, the most 
prevailing language is Thai language.
Furthermore, to operate acceptably in the mainstream of Thai 
society extending beyond the confines of his/her group, an ethnic 
group must achieve a certain minimal (maximal?) proficiency in and 
adaptation to the linguistic skills, behavioral patterns, and attitudinal 
values of the dominant Siamese-Buddhist community, as well as a 
certain minimal acceptability by that community. Indeed this school 
of thought presupposes a majority identification and standard in a core 
culture.
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Comparing the Three Approaches
That all three approaches - melting pot, cultural pluralism and core 
culture - have enjoyed some currency is partly because each expresses 
longstanding value preferences; each claims not only to describe 
what actually is, but what ethically and ideally ought to be. Clearly, 
each approach has some political implications. The melting pot 
refrains and discourages the organization of distinctly ethnic political 
organizations and interest groups such as found in Southern Thailand 
and also equally true to some other parts of the country. Under this 
theory, ethnic politics is viewed as the perpetuation of divisive 
factions and parochialisms inimical to the best interests of a “united 
Thailand”. On the other hand, the recognition of cultural pluralism 
enhances the mosaic of groups woven into the fabric of distinct ethnic 
entities within Thailand. Cultural pluralism provides ample flexibility 
to the different ethnic groups to express their grievances and present 
their respective interests and preserve their cultural identities. It is the 
most viable way to guarantee peaceful co-existence among groups.
The implications of the core culture idea are probably more 
subtle. In essence it suggests a unified political elite working for the 
good of the total community with the tools of “good government” 
centered in Bangkok. This theory provides broad criteria for detecting 
and curtailing the influence of “alien” politics that threaten the 
stability of the society. Radicals importing foreign ideologies and 
group efforts to promote ethnic pride have been seen as undermining 
the core values of Thai society. 
As might be evident, one reason why all three models may 
seem plausible is because each enjoys some kind of empirical 
base. For instance, there is evidence that some groups disappear in 
a larger cultural totality, and insofar as members of these groups 
contribute to a distinct Thai life, the melting pot idea has empirical 
support. The scattered linguistic and culturally autonomous ethnic 
communities in Thailand lend some support to the idea of cultural 
pluralism. Nevertheless, over and above such pluralism, there exist 
dominant and basic standards, values and living styles, while not free 
of contradictions and variations, still seem to represent established 
patterns that are far more than merely federations of quasi-autonomous 
cultures, a fact that substantiates the core culture theory.
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THE POLITICIZATION OF ETHNICITY IN THAILAND
In Thailand, perhaps, ethnic politics has started shortly after King 
Chulalongkorn’s annexation of the territories of the Sultanate of 
Pattani through administrative act officially known as Thesaphiban in 
1897 (Ahmad Amir Bin Abdullah, 2008: 105). The Malay Muslims 
resisted their incorporation into the Kingdom of Thailand, but to no 
avail. For instance, the Malay Muslim expressed their rejection to any 
plan to integrate the region into the Thai-body politic.  In this sense, 
Nik Anuar Nik Mahmud argued that as early as 1940s the Malay 
Muslims in Southern Thailand have been disenchanted against the 
Bangkok regime which led to the emergence of Gabungan Melayu 
Pattani Raya (Union of Malay for Great Pattani) known as GAMPAR 
as an independence movement in Southern Thailand (Nik Anuar Nik 
Mahmud, 1999). Indeed, in 1948, some 250,000 Malay Muslims 
asked the United Nations to oversee accession of the Thai provinces 
of Pattani, Narathiwat and Yala to the Federated States of Malaya 
(Melvin, 2007: 14). 
With the passage of time conflict of interests have ensued and 
seem no signs of ending soon at the time of the writing of this paper. 
The instituted Thai national regimes find themselves face to face with 
formidable problems of scarcity of resources and a legacy of distorted 
patterns of economic, social and political development. Competition 
over scarce resources creates antagonisms and conflicts among 
different groups and regions or provinces. Under such pressures 
politics for traditional political parties is reduced to retention of 
power, bringing personal gains through ability to control the process 
of allocation of funds and capital (H. Moddick, 1969). In most cases 
the groups that had a head start in education and other indicators of 
modernization usually had custody over politico-military power. To 
the disfranchised Malay Muslims, independence meant a change of 
masters with favoritism and nepotism dominating the social, economic, 
military and political scenes in Southern Thailand, specifically, the 
provinces of Pattani, Narathiwatt and Yala. As one source aptly puts 
it “if political institutions etc. do not possess institutional integrity 
and appear to be in the control of particular religious or communal 
interests, these communal groups lacking power and position will 
tend to question the legitimacy of the institutional order and will be 
encouraged politically to ‘go in alone (R. Nelson & H. Wolpe, 1970: 
1120). This is exactly what is happening in Southern Thailand. For 
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instance, the separatist movement in Southern Thailand emerged 
because many Malay Muslims turned inward, creating their own 
institutions to replenish social, psychological, and cultural values that 
cannot find fulfillment in the larger Thai society (Shamsuddin L. Taya, 
2009). As a result, distinct organizations and cultural practices were 
developed to compensate for disenchantment with the ongoing socio-
political and cultural order (Shamsuddin L. Taya, 2009). Politically, 
economically, culturally, and socially, the Malay Muslims were/are 
deprived and burdened with a deep feeling of socio-economic and 
political inferiority and deprivation.
On the other hand, there is substantial evidence to believe 
that the emerging middle class intelligentsia provides the cultural 
entrepreneurs which give ideological form to sub-national 
communities (C. Young, 1976). Lack of resources in the face of ever 
increasing demands dictates claims on behalf of small regional or 
ethnic groups (N. Glazer & D. Moynihan, 1975). To lobby effectively 
for its interests, such groups have to organize. The stage is set for 
ethnic politics. This is typically the situation in Thailand.
There are also objective factors which have made the issue of 
‘ethnic identities’ one of decided relevance to the Thai society. Most 
important among these are: 
1. Social pluralism: It is believed that more than 30 distinct ethnic 
groups coexist in Thailand.
2. Linguistic pluralism: Together with the dominant Thai language, 
several additional vernaculars are spoken in Thailand.
3. Religious pluralism: The people of Thailand are categorized as 
Buddhists, Christians, Muslims and Hill tribe people.
4. Administrative boundaries: These have sometimes provided 
reference point for identification for some groups.
Such factors, though important, are not sufficient by themselves 
to evoke ethnic stirrings. We should seek for other causal factors. 
Structural inequalities in the socio-economic domain played an 
important role in intensifying conflicts and grudges (David N. Balam 
& M. Veseth, 2001; Shamsuddin L. Taya, 2009).  A core area of 
heavy investment was centered on the capital of the country. This 
part was the major source of the country’s commercial production 
and was favored in terms of social services. The same unevenness was 
discernible in the area of communication and transportation, a fact 
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necessitated by the need for efficient and profitable undertakings of 
the Thai royal families and other countries centered at Bangkok, the 
country’s capital city. The same policy dictated similar disparities in 
the educational field, where the Thai administration adopted an elitist 
approach in this respect in order to supply Siamese Buddhist civil 
servants. 
Rather than attempting to engender balanced processes of 
modernization, the Bangkok government selected instead to nurture 
highly centralized modernizing patterns with an eye to their own 
needs. In the process the outlying areas of the country were neglected 
and victimized. It was natural that cities such as Bangkok and others 
branched out rapidly as commercial and industrial centers. Collateral 
with that development was a sustained pace of social and political 
consciousness; a bourgeois class was in the making. The uneven 
distribution of socio-political, economic and educational facilities 
produced relatively large numbers of young educated people, who 
later constituted an important layer in the national political and 
administrative set-up.
The Khwamphethai Process
What we practically have as a result of these developments was a 
gradual emergence of the “Simaese Buddhists” of the center with 
virtually full monopoly over economic, administrative and political 
powers in the capital city, Bangkok. The Thainess policy was 
intensified when the ultra-nationalist’s regime took over power and 
embarked on a policy of forced assimilation of different minority 
groups into the mainstream Thainess or Khwamphenthai (Brown, 
1994;  Rahimullah, 2003) as pointed earlier. The Thai government 
aimed to absorb the cultures, religions, and languages of other 
minorities more specifically, the Malay Muslims, into the dominant 
Siamese-Buddhist culture. The Thai government has used government 
establishments such as schools, universities, the media and so forth to 
carry this forward.
The assimilation process was even more thorough and quick 
for those who chose to move to Bangkok in search of education and 
jobs. One may speak of a new blend pouring from the Thai crucible or 
a pluralistic patchwork of ethnic cultures, but adherents of this school 
of thought have explicitly or implicitly assumed that there is a “core 
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culture” in Thailand, composed of essentially Siamese-Buddhist 
values, life styles, and identifications, to which a great number of ethnic 
cultures- except perhaps for the South- are in some way related. Such 
is the stance of most Monk leaders who take pride in Thailand as one 
of the Buddhist countries in Southeast Asian region. By intentionally 
laying the foundation for these structural inequalities, the Thai elites 
were leaving behind a ticking time bomb. They rendered Thailand an 
area of potential ethnic cleavages between the haves and the have-
nots. 
However, this political development was very promising and 
beneficial to the Siamese Buddhists. They saw and considered this 
as their golden opportunity for their future political control which 
may lead to their dream that Thailand should a Buddhist country. 
Nevetheless, Khwamphethai was indeed, a serious blow to the Malay 
Muslims. It was very disappointing and devastating to their aspirations. 
The Great Kingdom Pattani (now provinces of Pattani, Narathiwat 
and Yala) was incorporated without their consent into the territorial 
integrity and sovereignty of the modern Thailand. Worse than that 
was the fact that the Malay Muslims were excluded from the public 
governance of their nation. Many Malay Muslims leaders resented 
this gross injustice, discrimination, oppression and marginalization. 
THE FUNCTIONS OF ETHNIC POLITICS
Many people in Thailand have united from time to time by ethnic bonds 
and used politics to secure material goals, to satisfy psychological 
needs, and on occasion, to bring about fundamental changes in civic 
values. We shall now take each of these functions in more detail.
Material Goals: Economic and Patronage 
Economic deprivation does explain the political pull of ethnicity. 
Ethnic groups, in Thailnad and elsewhere, have turned to politics in 
order to provide essential social services and economic advancement. 
Ethnicity in Southern Thailand and perhaps elsewhere, is practically 
synonymous with low socio-economic status members who occupy 
minority positions of deprivation and discrimination, their aim being 
to wrest material benefits and values from the centre. These peripheral 
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groups knew that the dominant political groups would not voluntarily 
relinquish material values to the deprived areas at the same time these 
marginalized groups cannot live on the crumbs from the table of the 
dominant power holders. Obviously the onus of poverty, neglect and 
economic deprivation has led ethnics in the south to seek political 
redress throughout the political history of Thailand.
Psychological Goals: The Self Esteem of the Victim
Ethnics groups of Southern Thailand felt that their lack of status is 
due to discrimination and other structural inequalities designed and 
perpetuated by the Bangkok government. Most of the Malay Muslims 
went to the extreme of calling attention to the existence of an internal 
colonial system” which has led to resource allocation along “ethnic 
or religious lines.” For an ethnic group’s failure to achieve status, 
one could blame a discriminatory society, a society dominated by 
the Buddhist elements, who also profess Buddhism. Thus the ethnic 
group does not place the onus of poverty and material success on the 
individual.
While concerned with the pursuit of material goals as primary 
objective, ethnic politics has also stressed compensatory efforts to 
acquire honor, dignity, respect, and self-esteem.  These feelings of 
rejection, led some to withdraw from Thai politics, cultivate studied 
apathy, and create social situations in which one was esteemed despite 
his ethnic affiliation. This was the case, for instance, with some Malay 
Muslims who had attained material success and education and opted 
to live in Bangkok. These are then some of the non-political ways 
in which ethnics of Thailand coped with the problems of group and 
individual self-esteem. However, ethnic group members could not 
always resort to this sense of withdrawal and resignation. For the 
majority of ethnic groups in Southern Thailand, political organization 
provided an avenue for the stormy expression of emotions, acute 
resentment, and the longing for recognition of one’s human worth. 
Politics also provided ethnic groups of the region with a means of 
seeking recognition and respect. A typical example is the establishment 
of the GAMPAR as an avenue to protect and advance the Malay 
Muslims groups in Southern Thailand. This politics of recognition 
and respect was in most cases a search for confirmation that public 
officials in Bangkok would listen to the marginalized Malay Muslims, 
and thus it has symbolic value to group members. 
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This feeling of neglect by ethnics was perhaps behind the blunt 
refusal of many Malay Muslims groups to be part of the Thai system. 
Because of the lack of recognition, and admittedly, by way of reaction, 
many of the aspirants for power fell back on their ethnic and regional 
constituencies, leading to the emergence of several ethnically-based 
and possibly ethnically-biased political movements.
 
Civic Values as Ethnic Political Goals
Ethnic political behavior has conditioned basic Siamese Buddhists 
civic values that are the root ideas about the form and content of the 
controversial permanent constitution of the country and the structure 
and purposes of the government itself. Such critical effects fly in 
the face of a core culture interpretation that holds inherited political 
values as sacrosanct and enduring. Three major examples will help to 
clarify this point: 
First, the cumulative opposition to traditional political elites 
and leadership group based on family and property. Most ethnic 
groups have strenuously fought against this monopoly of power by 
the privileged few, placing the problems of the country in widest 
political context and by calling for a radical restructuring of power, 
promotion of self-determination, and an end to the conscious and 
subconscious prejudices that have marred Thai political life. Most 
leaders of ethnic political groups are drawn basically from achieved 
rather than ascriptive elites. Second, great emphasis on government 
as an agency of collective benefits and the demand for the fair 
distribution of wealth and opportunities. It is natural that a concept 
like class exploitation has been introduced into the main stream of 
Thai political life by the ethnics. As one scholar put it the ethnics 
have developed a “new liberation philosophy” which reflects a shift 
in emphasis by the underprivileged groups from purely political and 
cultural demands which characterized that movement till now, to 
the more encompassing emphasis on socio-economic and political 
demands. Under this new philosophy, it now seems crystal clear that 
the future of a peaceful united Philippines no longer rests on granting 
the marginalized regions and groups token and symbolic political 
powers over their local affairs, but a genuine autonomy or self-
determination so as for them to shape their own future. Third is the 
vehement and mounting opposition by the Siamese Buddhists settlers 
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in Southern Thailand against any Bangkok government’s offer to 
grant self-determination to the people in Southern Thailand. 
THE ORGANIZATIONAL BASE OF THE THAI 
ETHNIC POLITICS
If ethnic politics is based on strong group identification, then it is 
ethnic associations which are responsible for the initial development 
of these identifications. The first political impact of marginalized 
areas and groups was channeled through diverse fraternal societies 
based on common ethnic ties. That initial step promoted the formation 
of an ethnic consciousness that would later burst forth into the Thai 
politics. Responding to the needs of uprooted individuals, the ethnic 
social associations provided renewed strength for the common ties 
that had been loosened during the struggle for independence and 
the phase directly following its attainment. Group consciousness 
was quickly turned into “group nationalism” and political loyalty. 
The associations and social clubs formed by ethnic groups laid the 
framework for ethnic politics in another way. The heart of the ethnic 
association was in the provision of mutual aid and welfare. That 
welfare was not confined to the material domain, but it was in certain 
instances of ideological nature as exemplified by the role of various 
groups in Southern Thailand. 
So, ethnic organizations have perpetuated ethnic politics by 
providing identification, political styles, and core values for their 
members (Shamsuddin L. Taya, 2010: 19-34).  However, the political 
impact of social associations based on ethnic ties was tempered by 
circumstances of organizational strength and position. Organizational 
resources are most readily mobilized for defensive politics, that is, 
when a basic tenet of the ethnic group, ultimately its survival, is 
threatened. Social clubs were least likely to enjoy political impact 
when divisive political and social policies, such as the promulgation 
of the constitution, were at issue. New and divisive political and social 
policies could only be supported by a secure and imaginative political 
leadership, hence the transformation of these ethnic associations into 
political parties, revolutionary groups and many others  serving the 
interests of a specific ethnic or regional constituency. The popular 
uprising of 1990s furnished that opportunity. That period witnessed 
the resurgence violence.
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THE PATTERN OF ETHNIC POLITICS IN THAILAND
Any general effort to account for ethnicity’s persistence in Thai 
politics raises the question of the dominant forms ethnic politics 
has taken. We can identify three main responses adopted by the 
various Thai ethnic groups, namely, accommodation, separatism, and 
radicalism. Each pattern represents an attempt to secure certain values 
under certain structural and cultural conditions with certain political 
consequences.
Each of the three patterns is significantly influenced by the 
cultural framework of ethnicity and the availability of political 
institutions to express ethnic claims on the polity that is one ethnic 
group may strongly desire to accommodate itself to prevailing political 
styles, while another may have strong cultural traditions tending to 
keep it separate.
The dominant politics of accommodation requires that political 
and economic benefits are available to assuage ethnic demands, 
and that these benefits are distributed evenly. Accommodation also 
requires the recognition on the part of power holders concerning the 
right of the underprivileged groups in power sharing. The essence 
of recognition politics is, therefore, a psychological reconciliation 
of the ethnic groups to the existing political structure. In other 
words, recognition politics is a means of providing evidence that the 
political organization has honored the group and taken account of 
its accumulated grievances by symbolic mass incorporation into the 
governance process. As might be expected the major groups in the 
capital of Thailand to whom the reigns of power have fallen and whose 
culture has pervaded the Thai society, have been accommodated. 
These groups are represented by former Thai Foreign Minister and 
currently ASEAN Secretary General Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, former 
Royal Thai Army Chief and Council for National Security retired 
General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, current head of the Central Islamic 
Committee of Thailand Asis Pitakkumpol  (Abdul Aziz Bin Ismail), 
etc. As to the marginalized groups in Pattani, Narathiwat and Yala 
provinces, a few of their claims were met, the most urgent were side-
stepped or given only symbolic recognition. As these claims were not 
met, either fully or at all, the other alternatives came into play.
The independence movements in the Southern Thailand 
represent the antithesis of the accommodation model. Separatism 
occurs when an ethnic group turns inward, creating its own 
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institutions to replenish social, psychological, and cultural values that 
cannot find fulfillment in the larger society (Shamsuddin L. Taya, 
2009: 53). In secessionist politics, distinct organizations and cultural 
practices are developed to compensate for disenchantment with the 
ongoing political and social order. The base of political separatism 
is the ethnocentrism that animates ethnic group existence. Politics 
of separation is not mainly confined to Southern Thailand, but also 
in some other regions of the country. Economically and socially, the 
Malay Muslims are deprived and burdened with a deep feeling of 
racial inferiority, many of whom lived in desolation and squalor, beset 
by every known kind of social pathology. The corresponding reaction 
from certain groups in southern Thailand to these various forms of 
discrimination was armed violence and crises promoting separatism 
of the Malay Muslim homeland against the Thai government. 
For its part, ethnic radicalism may stress ideology because 
the promises of the existing ideologies have become hollow and 
redundant. The current and active violent secessionist movement 
in the south best illustrates this mode of political behavior in 
contemporary Thailand. The movement has performed an important 
function in dramatizing racial, political and religious discrimination 
in Thailand. According to its Manifesto the movement has a nation-
wide goal and a definite ideological objective of socio-economic and 
political development for the whole Thailand. To conclude, the long-
term dilemma is that if public institutions do not grant some power 
and recognition to deprived groups, the nihilistic option of violence 
and disorder in Thailand is unlikely to abate.
SYNTHESIZING THE THEORY AND PRACTICE 
OF ETHNIC POLITICS
The major effort of this study has been to synthesize the theories 
and practices of Thai ethnic politics. Currently, the Thai government 
is engaged in a critical struggle to accommodate the demands of 
peripheral groups who are seeking a larger share in the national 
resources. Although little in these pages provides prescriptive 
guidelines for experts and policymakers, this analysis ought to at least 
clarify the variety of issues at stake in the present ethnic struggle in 
the region. For every ethnic group operating under given political 
conditions, particular political mechanisms will produce responses 
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designed to award group members various human values. Which 
one of the three models is more capable to bring peace, unity and 
prosperity to Thailand: accommodation, separatism, or radicalism? It 
is a question yet to be answered.
In its emphasis on divisible benefits and on the awarding of 
particular political positions to representatives of designated groups, 
the accommodation framework would accomplish several things. It 
would provide some necessary goods, services, and recognition to 
the minority groups struggling for survival in Southern Thailand. It 
would also restrain the divisive proliferation of class and ideological 
politics that would arouse public passions. By carefully absorbing 
ethnic political organizations and their leaders, while providing 
mass recognition and services, it would promote a genuinely liberal 
social policy within the framework of generally conservative 
religious and nationality attitudes. By recognizing the existence and 
claims of discernible ethnic groups, accommodation politics would 
infuse considerable stability into Thai political system. Founded as 
it is on the rapport between the centre and its autonomous region, 
accommodation politics is suited to handle mass collective claims 
for the Malay Muslims self-determination so as to shape their 
socio-economic and political destination within the framework of 
Thai integrity. The essence of accommodation politics and ethnic 
“recognition” is an underlying consensus on the enduring stability of 
pluralistic politics. By channeling discontent into legitimate political 
forms, accommodation politics could reduce the level of political 
tension, the importance of political ideology, and the excesses of 
political passion.
Separatism, the antithesis of accommodation, is the popular 
choice of many ethnic groups in Southern Thailand at the present 
time. In the absence of pragmatic accommodation politics, separatist 
tendencies have developed and ethnic political drives are converted 
into social and psychological forms as group members further 
withdraw from the dominant political system in order to find a stronger 
foundation for cultural and personal identity. This development 
(feeling of withdrawal from the Thai system) is a real and imminent 
threat to the Thai sovereignty and territorial integrity. It seems 
reasonable to assume that the question of separation arises in the minds 
of many Malay Muslims from time to time, to deal with “Bangkok 
intransigence.” Yet another approach based on radical politics that is 
best represented by the current active violent secessionist movement is 
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gaining ground. It believes in the transformational method to radically 
restructure the political process in Deep South of Thailand by using 
violent methods such as bombing etc. 
CONCLUSION
In the light of the above analysis one really wonders whether separatist 
and radical politics would have arisen in the first place in Deep South 
of Thailand, had there been an elaborate accommodation system 
operative in the country that takes into consideration the legitimate 
grievances of the marginalized Malay Muslims people. In this respect, 
it is therefore important to recognize that the Bangkok government 
must accommodate urgently the grievances of the marginalized and 
oppressed Malay Muslim people through granting them meaningful, 
substantive and responsive self-government in Deep South of the 
country. 
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